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                                                          Bruce Ballard 
                                                           for Jeremiah 
͚If God is oŵŶisĐieŶt, oŵŶipoteŶt, aŶd oŵŶi-benevolent, then why is there (so much) evil in the 
ǁorld?͛ ruŶs the proďleŵ of eǀil. Or ŵore forĐefullǇ, doesŶ͛t the oĐĐurreŶĐe of ;so ŵuĐhͿ 
worldly evil actually imply the non-existence of such a God, as the leading atheological gambit, 
the ͞arguŵeŶt froŵ eǀil,͟ ĐoŶteŶds? 
           IŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of theodiĐǇ or defeŶse agaiŶst the arguŵeŶt froŵ eǀil, ͞eǀil͟ sigŶifies ďoth 
what is wrongly done by humans (moral evil, sin) and what is bad, something we undergo which 
runs counter to our desires (suffering). Following Aristotle, we may think of the ultimate good as 
happiness, that which we seek for its own sake and which, as a goal, conditions our choices and 
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habit formation across the range of human actions and feelings.  Happiness is the fulfillment of 
our human nature.  For Christian theism, ultimate happiness is found in relationship with God.  
That divinely intended good is the final end for humans.  In its fullest expression is the end of sin 
and suffering.   
Because the argument from evil primarily concerns suffering, that will be our focus here.  
We begin by examining the connection between the philosophical and existential dimensions of 
the problem of and argument from evil as suffering.  Next we consider the role of the affect in the 
constitution and interpretation of experience generally, together with the implications for the 
argument from suffering.  Third, we look at how a key affectual element of the argument from 
evil might undercut that argument.  Finally, we consider a proposal to categorize suffering as a 
species of moral or spiritual failure, i.e. as affectually wrong. 
The apologetic or philosophical problem of suffering, that is, how one may respond to the 
argument from suffering as a philosophical challenge is often distinguished from the existential 
problem of suffering or how one’s beliefs, attitudes and actions will be affected in relation to God 
in the face of, say, one’s own experience of suffering.  The existential problem has also been 
called the psychological or pastoral or religious or practical problem. Alvin Plantinga and Peter 
van Inwagen, among many others who address the apologetic problem, disclaim any direct 
connection between the philosophical and existential challenges. Yet there may be more 
connection between the two than first appears. 
In principle, even slightly negative experiences are logically available to the argument 
from suffering.  Woody Allen joked that he could not believe in the existence of a beneficent 
creator who would let him get his tongue caught in the typewriter.  Were we to adduce such 
negative experiences to argue against God’s goodness, however, the general consensus of what 
should count as misery would ordinarily disqualify them.  A certain experiential threshold is 
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necessary to really motivate the problem of suffering and especially the argument from suffering, 
albeit that threshold varies over time and across cultures.  So in the context of the argument from 
suffering, the most serious challenge comes not from the existence of any negative experience, 
but from negative experience in an extreme amount, especially if it looks like gratuitous 
suffering.  Hence John Hick defines suffering as a state of mind “in which we wish violently or 
obsessively that our situation were otherwise.”1 So the philosophical problem follows the curve of 
the existential problem. 
When do we reach the appropriately motivating threshold?  Here the social context can 
be significant.  If, for example, members of a religious congregation, friends, and family rally 
round the cancer victim, his or her experience of suffering, all things being equal, will not play in 
the same register as the one who suffers alone.  Indeed, we might equate the lived interpretation 
of the suffering experienced with its magnitude.  The inner, personal argument from suffering the 
sufferer may begin to consider, in doubt, will be harder to make for the socially loved one.  The 
same might be said where there is a direct inner experience of divine love.  Indeed, in both cases, 
the affectual experience of being loved can bring about tranquility and with it a rationale for our 
living apart from any intellectual defense against the argument from suffering.  Our personal 
standard of what is rational for us to believe or continue believing seems to contain an affective 
component, at least in relation to certain kinds of beliefs. 
Martin Heidegger noted that every mood or affectual orientation has its understanding 
and every understanding its mood.  That moods have rationales illustrates the point here.  If, for 
example, I am angry at X for losing my book and then discover that it was Y who lost it, my 
anger at X disperses at once.  Facts matter in affective rationales.  Aristotle’s account of 
emotional virtue and vice make sense to us for the same reason: “We can experience fear, 
confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally any kind of pleasure and pain either too much or too 
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 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 354. 
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little….  But to experience all this at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right 
people, for the right reason, and in the right manner—that is … the mark of virtue.”2  Were 
emotion sheer subjective projection or expression, we could make no sense of Aristotle here. 
Moods tune us in to our environment in particular ways, highlighting certain features and 
directing our purposeful action.  They contain interpretations of ourselves and others.  Parental 
love, for example, configures a whole world of relationship; it creates a teleology according to its 
own intrinsic logic.  It makes certain courses of action rational and others irrational.  Hence 
rationality in the case of the typically hedonic agent of so-called rational decision theory, 
affectually and ideologically determined in its individualism as it is, cannot count as rationality 
per se; it offers one rationale among many other possibilities. 
Altogether then, without the affective contribution we could not live, since nothing would 
count as significant or important to us, nothing would move us to act.  So, far from being a 
stumbling block to dispassionate reason, the affective contribution to the constitution of human 
experience is a sine qua non.  In that sense the affect’s role resembles the contribution of Kant’s a 
priori categories to sensory inputs in the synthesis of experience.  At least to some degree then, an 
experience of suffering, like all human experiences, is an interpretation constituted by an 
affectual understanding.  As Heidegger puts it, human existence is care, about ourselves, others, 
and our environment. 
Particular intellectual constructions of suffering, then, have their corresponding moods 
and vice versa.  So, for instance, accepting the free will response to the problem of suffering 
intellectually can also bring emotional solace.  And as we saw earlier, immediate powerful 
experience of love can directly evoke a new self-understanding and rationale for decision-
making.  But, in addition, the affect is or can be made subject to the will or intellect directly in 
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 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), 43. 
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important ways.  Hence classical Stoicism aimed to achieve serenity by withdrawing all affect 
from what exceeds the individual’s control, namely everything in the world but one’s attitude 
about it.  Yet when the experience of suffering is denatured by apatheia, what remains of 
existence falls short of what most consider life.  Even so, the fact that affect partly constitutes our 
experience and is at least in part subject to the will shows that there is no fixed, objectively 
determined quantum of suffering.  The morose boyfriend who kills himself over a breakup with 
his girlfriend may suffer more than the person with end-stage cancer who is loved deeply and has 
the hope of faith.  Circumstances where the will or intellect is no longer intact would pose a 
special case here, as would the cases of children and animals.  Such suffering requires a different 
kind of accounting. 
For the one who develops wisdom and virtue through the challenge of suffering, that 
suffering is not of the average “amount.”  Indeed, on balance, it may be felt and understood as a 
good.  This is the crux of the soul-making defense against the argument from suffering.  And it is 
nowhere more relevant than with the affect.  It is under the pressure of suffering that key virtues 
develop.  For if there were no bad consequences of our free will, there would be no occasions 
calling for patience, self-sacrifice, unselfishness, courage, or honesty as virtues or excellences in 
the world.  In fact, as Hick argues, the capacity to sympathize with and love those in calamity 
actually requires that there be a distribution of evil not in keeping with our deserts since, if it were 
so distributed, no one would deserve our sympathy.  Hick cites Royce here: “Even love shows its 
glory as love only by its conquest over the doubts and estrangements, the absences and the 
misunderstandings, the griefs and the loneliness, that love glorifies with its light amidst all their 
tragedy.”3  And the famous discourse on love of I Corinthians 13 speaks similarly of the nature of 
love in relation to what it overcomes.  For Christian theism all of these character qualities are 
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 As cited in Hick, 362 footnote. 
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important preparation for and incipient experience of eternal life with God, a limitless good 
outweighing all finite suffering. 
But those outside any particular religious confession have also seen the soul-making 
result of suffering.  Aristotle’s discussion of the development of virtue in the passions certainly 
includes this overcoming aspect.  Or consider Michael J. Fox in his 2002 memoir, Lucky Man:  
“If you were to rush in to this room right now and announce that you had struck a deal-with God, 
Allah, Buddha, Christ, Krishna, Bill Gates, whomever-in which the ten years since my diagnosis 
[with incurable progressive disease of the central nervous system] could be magically taken away, 
traded in for ten more years as the person I was before, I would, without a moment's hesitation, 
tell you to take a hike [dust jacket]."  So what looked like a clear instance of severe, long-term 
suffering and a premise for an argument from suffering is intellectually and affectually 
reconstituted as something quite different. 
Or consider Mabel and the effect of divine love in her suffering: “One side of her face 
was being eaten by cancer.  There was a discolored and running sore covering part of one cheek, 
and it had pushed her nose to one side, dropped one eye, and distorted her jaw so that what should 
have been the corner of her mouth was the bottom of her mouth.  As a consequence, she drooled 
constantly…this woman was eighty-nine years old and that she had been bedridden, blind, nearly 
deaf, and alone, for twenty-five years.”4  It is probably impossible for those outside such 
affliction to genuinely appreciate it.  Indeed, it is difficult to understand how a well-meaning 
visitor might even address her. 
Her life also seems to be paradigmatic evidence for the argument from suffering.  Yet to 
a visitor who asks her what she thinks about while lying in her bed, she replies: ‘I think about my 
Jesus.  I think about how good He’s been to me.  He’s been awfully good to me in my life, you 
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know….  He’s all the world to me.’5  And with her experience of Christ, Mabel not only preempts 
a personal argument from suffering, but also makes her suffering unavailable to the outsider for a 
more general argument from suffering. 
Of course alternative rejoinders to the argument from evil from an affectual angle are 
possible.  William Hasker, for example, finds an apparently self-thwarting element in the 
argument from suffering based on our moral sentiments.  He notes that the argument from 
suffering depends on a moral sentiment which, when violated, gives rise to moral protest.  
Extreme and/or gratuitous suffering seems unjust.  Without some moral feeling, apparent 
discrepancy between evil done and evil received would not issue in protest.  Even the 
philosophical challenge depends on this sort of moral care.  Yet can the indignant one be 
existentially authentic in his or her protest?  Hasker argues that this is impossible.6 
He begins by asking the objector whether he or she is glad to exist, a person-relative 
appeal to each one’s core value sentiments.  Next he proposes that my existence depends on the 
coming to be of my body.  If I am glad I exist, I cannot be sorry my body came to be.   But if my 
body is a necessary condition of my existence as a person, then whatever my body needs to exist, 
I also need.  To be the person I am requires particular parents at a particular time.  Many 
contingent causes played into my parents meeting, marrying, and conceiving me at a given time.  
Were I to trace back through their ancestors for the same sorts of contingent causes, I would very 
likely find that war, famine, sickness, disease, betrayal, even murder and adultery all played a role 
in making my existence possible.  So Hasker concludes: “Had major or significant events in the 
world’s past history been different than they were, then in all probability neither I nor the persons 
whom I love would even have existed.”7   
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 Ibid., 111-112. 
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 Michael Peterson, God and Evil (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), cf. 114-120. 
7
 Ibid., 117. 
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Here is where the moral protest against evil becomes self-thwarting.  If I object that no 
good or just God would have tolerated the manifold suffering of the world yet I am glad for my 
own existence and its necessary conditions (the manifold suffering), I have a contradictory will.  
On the other hand, if I am not glad I exist, perhaps even leaning to suicide, this argument cannot 
be made.  Altogether, then, Hasker very intriguingly suggests how the affectual component of the 
argument from suffering might be turned back upon itself. 
Does Hasker’s argument work?  If his premises were all true, it would be a powerful 
argument speaking directly from and to the existential element of the problem of suffering.  Yet 
his principal move is suspect.  If I will my existence, even my body, am I thereby committed to 
willing, say, the abduction and rape of my great-grandmother, had that led to the conception of a 
grandparent?  Or, alternatively, must I will the suicide of her fiancé so that she could come to 
marry my great-grandfather?  If my German parents met and married in the US having fled as 
children with their parents from WWII, am I committed to willing Hitler?   
Here a question of personal identity arises.  Abstracting away from all but biological 
conditions for my existence, I might have to commit to a certain genealogy.  But that just means 
my parents meeting, marrying, and conceiving me, for example.  I am just as consistent to will 
this having happened in Germany as in America.  I can will that my great-grandmother decided to 
drop suitor number one in preference for my great-grandfather rather than suitor one killing 
himself.  It isn’t easy to see why I must commit beyond a set of sufficient historical conditions of 
my coming to be, why I must commit to the actual historical sequence.  For that actual sequence 
is not necessary in principle for my existence.  Alternatively, I could consistently will that God 
create me like Adam, de novo, without any human progenitors, without any history.   
Finally, let us consider John Hick’s claim that suffering just is sin.  In that case, the 
problem of suffering is successfully met by a changed affectual understanding away from our 
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self-centeredness and toward God.  As Hick puts it: “If we were fully conscious of God and His 
universal purpose of good we should be able to accept our life in its entirety as God’s gift and be 
free from anguish on account of it.”8  There is clearly something to this for Christian theism.  
Hick could garner significant support for this claim drawing on the pertinent biblical sources, as 
also for his claim that Christ suffered for others.  Yet protest Psalms are also part of the canon.  
And Christ appeared to suffer for his own part as well.  On the cross He cries out to God as 
having forsaken Him.  He is clearly full of anguish in Gethsemane with his disciples, sweating 
blood over his coming crucifixion.  Is He weeping only for others at the tomb of his friend 
Lazarus?  If the existential problem can be solved, perhaps the drama of suffering en route is a 
necessary condition for that solution
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